The New Russian Schism: A Break from Eastern Orthodoxy

Without Ukraine, Russia is going its own way.

Ukraine's recent decision to officially ban the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate has sparked a flurry of debate, particularly among those who view this action as an assault on Orthodox Christianity itself. However, this perspective is both misguided and uninformed. It is essential to clarify that Ukraine obviously has not banned Orthodox Christianity itself. Instead, what has been expelled is the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church, an institution that has long functioned as a de facto extension of Russian political power - a "fifth column" within Ukrainian society, especially in the context of the ongoing Russian invasion. In contrast, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), which gained its Tomos of Autocephaly in 2019 from the Ecumenical Patriarch in Constantinople, continues to practice freely as an independent, self-governing entity.

The granting of autocephaly to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine marked a pivotal moment not only in the ecclesiastical landscape but also in the broader historical and cultural context of Eastern Orthodoxy. The Russian Orthodox Church's refusal to recognize this autocephaly has led to a schism with the Ecumenical Patriarchate. This rift is more than a mere ecclesiastical disagreement; it is yet another manifestation of a significant shift in Russia’s relationship with European culture - a process that can be understood through the lens of Oswald Spengler's concept of Pseudomorphosis.

Pseudomorphosis, a term coined by Spengler, refers to the phenomenon in which an emerging culture is overlaid by the forms of an older, more dominant culture, stifling the young culture’s organic development. In the context of Russia, this process began with the Church reforms initiated by Patriarch Nikon in the 17th century. These reforms aimed to align Russian-Muscovite Orthodox practices and canonical texts with those of Greek Orthodoxy, an effort that was met with significant resistance. Those who opposed the reforms, clinging to the original Muscovite practices, became known as the "Old Believers." Significantly, Ukrainian clerics and theologians were at the forefront of these reforms, playing a crucial role in integrating Muscovite Orthodoxy with Greek traditions.

The religious reforms initiated by Nikon and Peter the Great’s more intense and overarching social Westernization policies that followed later imposed a European veneer on Russian society - a veneer that never fully settled. This situation is reminiscent of the introduction of Greek-Byzantine Christianity into the Germanic world by the Carolingian rulers in the 8th and 9th centuries - most emphatically by Charlemagne, who can be viewed the historical counterpart of Peter the Great. Just as the newly introduced norms of Graeco-Roman Christianity sat uneasily upon the Germanic people, leading to continuous tension between Latin-Germanic Christianity and Byzantine Christianity, so too did Nikon's and Peter the Great’s reforms create a persistent dissonance within Russian Orthodoxy and the Russian society as a whole.

The Great Schism of 1054, which formally divided Eastern Orthodoxy and Western Catholicism, was more than a dispute over rituals or doctrinal differences. It was the culmination of a deeper cultural divide, a counterposition of two different world-feelings - what Spengler would describe as the emergence of the Faustian spirit in Western Europe, breaking free from the Pseudomorphosis imposed by Byzantine Christianity. The Gothic architecture and the development of Scholasticism that followed in the West were manifestations of this newly liberated Faustian spirit, reflecting a uniquely Western (Faustian) world-feeling with Germanized Christianity.

Similarly, the schism within Eastern Orthodoxy today, catalyzed by the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Church, could foreshadow a significant transformation within Russian Orthodoxy. While Russia may accuse Ukraine of schism, it is, in fact, Russia that will be gradually separating itself from the broader Eastern Orthodox Christianity. As Ukraine moves closer to Europe, reaffirming its connection to the Greek Orthodox tradition, Russia may be on the path to developing a distinct form of Christianity, one that is uniquely Russian and resonates more deeply with its cultural essence.

This process has already been unraveling within the last century. The Bolshevik Revolution can be seen as the initial stage of Russia shedding its European veneer, beginning the long process of liberating itself from the constraints of Pseudomorphosis. Today, under Vladimir Putin, Russia continues to distance itself from European norms and values. The next stage in this evolution may be the emergence of a uniquely Russian form of Christianity - a Russian "Gothic Christianity" of sorts, one that is organically suited to the Russian soul. While it is difficult to predict the exact contours this new religious expression will take, a close study of the "Old Believers" could provide some clues. Their practices and beliefs, rooted in a pre-Petrine, pre-Westernized Russia, may offer a glimpse into what a truly indigenous Russian Christianity might look like.

The liberation of a nascent culture from Pseudomorphosis is often accompanied by intense hatred and ressentiment against the dominant culture under which it was suppressed. This pattern is evident in several historical examples. The rise of Islam, with its ethos of Jihad, was a manifestation of the Magian soul freeing itself from the bonds of Graeco-Roman civilization. Similarly, the Crusades, which coincided with the Great Schism, can be seen as an expression of the Germanic world's ressentiment against both Islam and the Byzantine Empire, representing the East (i.e, the Magian world) under whose shadow the Faustian spirit had long been suppressed. In the Germanic Europe, the Byzantine world was hated as intensely as the Muslim world - after all, the Fourth Crusade was launched against the Byzantine Empire, with the ensuing sack of Constantinople by the crusaders.

Today, as Russia frees itself from European Pseudomorphosis, it too is entering its own age of Crusades and Jihad, marked by an apocalyptic hatred of Western civilization. The invasion of Ukraine must be understood in this light, as part of a broader historical process. In fact, the representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church and various Russian political pundits already refer to the war against Ukraine as the Holy War! As Ukraine returns to Europe and distances itself from Russia, Russian Orthodoxy may also drift further away from Eastern Orthodoxy, returning to a more authentically Russian form of spirituality - one that harks back to the pre-Romanov era.

This historical trajectory suggests that Russia is in the midst of a profound cultural transformation, one that could have far-reaching consequences for its identity, its religion, and its place in the world. As it continues to cast off the remnants of its European Pseudomorphosis, Russia may emerge with a renewed sense of self, grounded in a unique religious and cultural tradition that is distinct from both the West and the rest of Eastern Orthodoxy. The future of Russian Christianity, like that of Russia itself, remains uncertain, but Spenglerian historiography can offer us a glimpse into what it might look like and enable us to make predictions. Conquest of Ukraine by Muscovy in the 17th century set in motion the process of European Pseudomorphosis in Russia. And losing Ukraine might very well set the final stage of Russia’s estrangement from the Faustian West and going its own way.